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Abstract 
We experimentally investigate the effects of real and minimal identities on group conflict. In 
turn we provide a direct empirical test of the hypotheses coined by Amartya Sen that the 
salience of a real identity escalates conflict but that of a mere classification would not do so. 
In a baseline treatment, two groups – East Asians and Caucasians – engage in a group contest, 
but information on the racial composition of the groups is not revealed. In the minimal identity 
treatment each group is arbitrarily given a different color code, whereas in the real identity 
treatment the race information is revealed. Supporting Sen’s hypotheses, we find that compared 
to the baseline, free-riding declines and conflict effort increases in the real identity treatment 
but not in the minimal identity treatment. Moreover, this occurs due to an increase in efforts in 
the real identity treatment by females in both racial groups.  
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1. Introduction 
Conflict between groups is omnipresent. Group members expend costly resources in such 
conflicts in order to gain material benefits, or to achieve social recognition, or to avoid a loss. 
Examples include racial conflict, conflict relating to language, religion or culture, political 
competition, collective rent-seeking, to name but a few. Such group conflicts are costly for the 
individual group members and often costly also for the society.1 It is hence not surprising that 
researchers across disciplines continue to study the reasons leading to such conflict, and 
possible ways to eradicate them. A component that is often seen to be common in initiation and 
escalation of various group conflicts is group identity. In this paper we consider this particular 
aspect and investigate the effects of the salience of specific types of identities on group conflict. 
We consider a real identity and a minimal identity in defining groups, and compare their effects 
on conflict relative to a situation in which no identity is made salient. 
In his seminal work, Sen (2007) introduces the relationship between the salience of an 
identity and conflict. Sen considers ‘identity’ as an attribute that provides a ‘strong-and 
exclusive-sense of belonging’ to a group. He hypothesizes that in certain situations, when a 
particular identity (e.g., religion or race) becomes salient, it can then engender conflict and can 
even lead to its escalation. He further introduces the concept of ‘classification’ and 
differentiates the same from ‘identity’. A classification (e.g. one’s shoe-size or one’s time of 
birth) is a mere categorization that is ‘cheap’ and does not necessarily have ‘durable 
importance’. It is also often interpreted as a minimal identity. As a result, when an identity or 
a classification determines the concept of a group, the salience of the (real) identity increases 
conflict but that of a minimal identity (classification) does not.2 In this study we conduct a 
laboratory experiment to investigate the relationship between the salience of identities and 
conflict. We ask the following questions: Is there empirical support for Sen’s hypotheses about 
the effects of identity on conflict? Does real identity initiate and instigate conflict more than 
does a mere classification (minimal identity)? Is the effect of identity symmetric across agents? 
We run a group contest experiment with a group specific public good prize. In this game 
group members expend individually costly effort for their group and the sum of all group 
                                                          
1 The earliest documented group conflict resulting in fatalities was between 14,000 BC and 12,000 BC in Nubia 
(present-day Sudan) in which at least 59 people died (Kelly, 2005). Almost 15,000 years later, in the last century, 
the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi populations in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda claimed more than a 
million lives. Even when fatalities are not involved, group conflicts often create costs such as long run tension 
and hatred, intentional destruction of property, expense of resources on unproductive defense activities, etc. 
2 Note, however, that when a classification gains durable importance then it may be as important as a real identity. 
We do not consider such classifications in our analysis, and return to this issue in the discussion.  
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members’ efforts influences the probability of winning the prize. Irrespective of the outcome 
of the contest, all players lose their efforts – resembling conflict situations in the field. 
Furthermore, irrespective of the individual effort expended, every member of the winning 
group wins the prize – again, replicating various field situations. We rely on the theory by Katz 
et al. (1990) and the experimental procedures in Abbink et al. (2010) for the basic structure of 
the experiment, and introduce the concepts of identity and classification within this structure. 
We employ three treatments. In the baseline, two three-player groups – one consisting 
of East Asians, and the other consisting of Whites (Caucasians) – engage in the group contest, 
but no information about the group composition is revealed. In the treatment capturing 
classification or minimal identity the same experiment is run, but each group is arbitrarily given 
a different color code. In the real identity treatment the racial compositions of the groups are 
revealed. We introduce race as the real identity since historically race provides one of the 
strongest and most exclusive-sense of belonging. To ensure that the design for the minimal 
identity treatment is as close as possible in spirit to the definition of classification by Sen (2007), 
the dimension of the categorization would have to be ‘cheap’ as well as ‘non-durable’ and easy 
to make salient. A random color code meets all these criteria and hence the same is 
implemented in the ‘classification’ treatment. In the baseline we did not provide any sense of 
categorization or belonging. Whereas the color codes provide the salience of an explicitly 
cheap and durably unimportant ‘categorization’; in the baseline treatment (given the frame and 
the instructions) this categorization remains absent, and hence is not salient. 
The relationship between identity and several other behavioral outcomes is well 
examined in the literature. Sherif et al. (1961), Turner (1978), and Tajfel & Turner (1979) 
among others investigate this broad topic in Social Psychology. Sherif et al. (1961) is a 
milestone in both identity and conflict research areas. They conduct a field experiment in which 
two groups of boys engage in a series of group competitions. To our knowledge, this is the very 
first ‘group contest’ research as well as the first group identity research in any branch of social 
science. The boys engaged in pre-contest group activities to induce group identity. It is found 
that over the time of the contests, the group members become hostile towards out-group 
members. Since this seminal study, social psychologists have studied the role of identity in 
prejudice (Brewer, 1999), discrimination (Sassenberg & Mummendey, 2003), stereotypes 
(Steele et al., 2002), among others.  
In the area of conflict as well, there have been important contributions by Tajfel & 
Turner (1979), Jackson (2002) and Tajfel (2010, ch. 2, 3, 10), among many others. Within 
Economics, Sen (1985) himself studies the effects of identity on coordination. However, the 
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exploration of the effects of identity in the economics literature starts with the seminal study 
by Akerlof & Kranton (2000). Since then, a series of studies have emerged.3 Chen & Li (2009) 
stand out by employing a minimal identity paradigm similar to the idea of ‘classification’ as 
explained in Sen (2007).  
Existing field studies or laboratory experiments in social psychology and in economics 
have shown that an introduction of an identity elicits in-group out-group discrimination.4 It has 
further been shown that group identity can be formed in terms of inequality (Esteban et al., 
2012a, b), or communication (Cason et al., 2012) and that such a group identity can be exploited 
to invoke stereotypes (Shih et al., 1999), to manage diversity (Eckel & Grossman, 2005), or to 
solve hold-up problems (Morita & Servátka, 2013). To explore identity related conflicts, 
existing experimental studies often employ games such as the prisoner’s dilemma, the dictator 
game or the public good game that examine ‘conflict of interests’ in agents, but are not designed 
to replicate group conflict situations in which group members expend costly resources to gain 
something. Thus, although the hypotheses coined in Sen (2007) are often discussed in various 
studies, there exists no research testing them, or to find the effects of different levels of identity 
on behavior. In this study we investigate, in a controlled setting, the effects of the salience of a 
particular identity and classification on ‘Conflict’ and provide direct empirical tests. 
Since we consider a public good prize in the group contest setting, the set of research 
closest to the current one are in the area of the effects of identity in social dilemma such as a 
public good or a threshold public good game (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Solow & Kirkwood, 
2002; Eckel & Grossman, 2005; Croson et al., 2008; Drouvelis & Nosenzo, 2013; Charness et 
al., 2014; Gumen, 2015). In each of these studies, at least in one treatment a specific identity 
is invoked in a social dilemma setting; and in general, such identity increases contribution. 
These studies often find heterogeneous effect of the identity among subjects.   
In our experiment, we find that in all the treatments subjects expend significantly more 
effort than is predicted by Nash equilibrium. However, efforts are significantly higher in the 
real identity (but not in the minimal identity) treatment than in the baseline treatment. 
Furthermore, these results are obtained both due to a reduction in free-riding (expending zero 
effort), and an increase in efforts in the real identity treatment. Neither racial group, as a whole, 
                                                          
3 For example, Robinson (2001), Akerlof & Kranton (2002, 2005, 2008, 2010), and Basu (2005) analyze the 
theoretical background and Fershtman & Gneezy (2001), Goette et al. (2006), Deck et al. (2009), Chen & Li 
(2009), Hargreaves Heap & Zizzo (2009), Chen & Chen (2011), Kranton et al. (2013), Chen et al. (2014), Stoddard 
and Leibbrandt (2014) pursue field and experimental studies in related areas. 
4 See, e.g., Tajfel & Turner (1979) from social psychology; and Benjamin et al. (2010), Deck et al. (2009), 
Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009), Klor and Shayo (2010), Cason et al. (2012) from economics. 
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behaves differently from the other. However, regardless of race, females expend significantly 
higher effort than males, and (in the line with the social dilemma literature) the difference 
widens when the real identity is revealed.  
There are existing studies in the literature that investigate the effects of identity on 
conflict behavior. Some studies (e.g. Kranton et al., 2012) employ a variation of a dictator game 
whereas some others (e.g. Gumen, 2015) employ a public good game. Furthermore, there are 
existing social preference studies on identity – as cited above – that find higher levels of in-
group preference with identity. Hence, it is important to distinguish this study from the existing 
ones, as well as emphasize the importance of the findings of the current study.  
Understandably, the reasons for conflict are intertwined with the social preferences of 
the agents. However, it is not established in the literature that the preference will definitely 
result in a higher conflict level for identity but not for classification. To our knowledge, ours 
is the first study in the identity literature that examines the effects of the ‘levels’ of identity 
(none to classification to real) on human behavior. Furthermore, we believe that we introduce 
a new and more appropriate framework in the relevant identity literature to analyze conflict. In 
any conflict agents expend irretrievable resources to gain something, and whereas only the 
winners gain, irrespective of the result everybody lose their expended resources. Only a contest 
game is appropriate to capture this feature. No other games can capture this basic and intrinsic 
feature of conflict. Take the public good game for example: these are very useful games to 
understand social dilemmas between own and societal interest and hence, are apt for analyzing 
‘conflict of interest’, but not ‘conflict’.   
Hence, in this paper we provide a framework that is the most appropriate in a laboratory 
setting to analyze conflict, and introduce identity in such a framework for the first time. We 
also introduce different levels of identity and provide with an empirical test of the hypotheses 
coined by Sen (2007). We confirm systematically, instead of simply conjecturing, that real 
identity indeed increases the initiation and the level of conflict, whereas a mere classification 
does not. The results make a two-fold contribution. They support Sen (2007)’s argument that 
a salient real identity initiates (in terms of the reduction of free-riding) and escalates (in terms 
of higher positive effort) conflict. Moreover, a minimal identity (classification) does not 
increase conflict significantly – further supporting his hypothesis. Investigating gender 
differences, we conclude that the effect of identity, at least in this set-up, is asymmetric across 
gender. This study also contributes to the literature on identity itself by incorporating and 
analyzing conflict, and show how various types of identity affect conflict behavior. 
6 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical 
background of the conflict model we use. Section 3 explains the design of the experiment. 
Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical background 
We study a group contest in which multiple groups compete for a prize. Group members expend 
costly effort that constitutes the ‘group effort’. The group effort determines the group’s 
likelihood of winning the prize. In particular, a group’s probability of winning the prize is equal 
to the group’s effort divided by the total group effort of all competing groups.  
Let the number of groups competing for the prize be 𝑛 (≥ 2) and the number of (risk-
neutral) group members in each group be 𝑚 (≥ 2). Each player 𝑖 in each group 𝑔 (= 1, 2, … 𝑛) 
has the same endowment, 𝑒 > 0, from which he/she can expend effort 𝑥𝑔𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑒]. Any effort 
expended by a member of group 𝑔 increases the likelihood that group 𝑔 will win the prize. Any 
endowment not expended remains with player i.  
The group effort of group 𝑔, 𝑋𝑔, is the sum of the effort expended by all members of 
group 𝑔, i.e., 𝑋𝑔 = ∑ 𝑥𝑔𝑖𝑖 . Let the total group effort by all groups competing for the prize, i.e., 
by all 𝑛𝑚 players, be 𝑋 = ∑ 𝑋𝑔𝑔 . The probability with which group 𝑔 wins the prize, 𝑝𝑔, is 
determined by a lottery contest success function (Tullock, 1980) and is given by 
𝑝𝑔 = {
𝑋𝑔/𝑋     if 𝑋 ≠ 0   
1/𝑛        otherwise
. 
The prize is a group-specific public good prize, i.e., each member of the winning group 
earns the prize regardless of their level of effort expended. Let the common prize value be 𝑉 >
0. The losing groups receive a prize of 0. The expected payoff of player i in group g is  
𝜋𝑔𝑖 = 𝑝𝑔𝑉 + (𝑒 − 𝑥𝑔𝑖), 
where the first term is the expected value of the prize and the second term is the part of the 
endowment that player i kept with them. From Katz et al. (1990) it can be shown that there 
exist multiple equilibria and individual equilibrium efforts cannot be characterized.5 However, 
in any equilibrium, the group effort for each group is  
𝑋∗ = 𝑉(𝑛 − 1)/𝑛2. 
In a finitely repeated game, the sub-game perfect equilibrium prediction is that each 
group will expend 𝑋∗ in each repetition of the stage game.  
                                                          
5 Katz et al. (1990) consider an additive group production technology. There are other technologies such as 
weakest-link (Lee, 2012), best-shot (Chowdhury et al., 2013), or a mix (Chowdhury and Topolyan, 2016) that are 
considered in the literature. But we restrict our attention to the most popular and obvious one as described above.  
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3. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
3.1 Design and Procedures 
The experiment consists of a finitely repeated contest between two groups of three group-
members each, and the core design is very similar to the design implemented in Abbink et al. 
(2010). In the experiment, each member of each group is endowed with 60 Experimental 
Currency Units (ECUs) which they can allocate to a group account or to an individual account. 
Once all individuals make a decision, the lottery contest success function is used to determine 
the winner. Each member of the winning group is awarded 40 ECUs. Subjects are then 
informed of the total ECUs in their group account, the total ECUs in the other group’s group 
account, which group has won the prize, and their individual earnings in ECUs from that period. 
Three-player groups and aggregated information feedback ensure no in-group reputation effect. 
This contest is repeated for 20 periods. Subjects cannot use past earnings in future 
periods and receive a fresh endowment of 60 ECUs in every period. At the end of the session, 
each subject is shown their individual earnings in ECUs in each of the 20 periods. All subjects 
are then paid for the same 5 periods chosen randomly at the rate of 25 ECUs to 1 GBP. In terms 
of the theoretical model presented above, the parameters of the contest in our experiment are 
𝑛 = 2, 𝑚 = 3, 𝑒 = 60 and 𝑉 = 40. Hence, the equilibrium prediction in our experiment is that 
group effort for each group is 10 ECUs, i.e., 𝑋∗ = 10, in each of the 20 periods.6 
In all treatments 9 subjects from each of the two racial cohorts, East Asians and Whites 
(Caucasians), participate in a session. Within each cohort, subjects are randomly and 
anonymously assigned to groups of three. Two groups – one from each racial cohort – are then 
randomly and anonymously paired. Thus, all three members of a group are from the same racial 
cohort and the two competing groups are composed of subjects from the two different racial 
cohorts.7 The matching within and between groups remains fixed throughout a session.  
It is important to clarify our subject-recruitment strategy due to the specific nature of 
the experiment. All the subjects were students at the University of East Anglia, UK. In this 
                                                          
6 Note that the endowment given to the subjects is higher than the Nash equilibrium level of group effort (𝑒 >
𝑋∗), so the theoretical prediction across treatments remains as the Nash equilibrium level of effort. Baik et al. 
(2016) show that even when 𝑒 > 𝑋∗, if the endowment is different across treatments then it can affect observed 
effort level across treatments due to behavioral reasons. But, since in our case the endowment is the same across 
treatments and we are interested in treatment effects, this does not affect our analysis. 
7 Since there are various real identities that can be considered as the focus of conflict, it is important to narrow 
down on a specific identity. Young (1982) argues that: “(r)ecent history suggests that the major pattern of conflict 
cohere around two organizing principles: class and ethnicity”. Indeed existing studies have shown that race or 
ethnicity remains one of the most important factors in various social conflicts across the globe (e.g. Esteban & 
Ray, 2012a, b; Reynal-Querol, 2002). Hence, in this paper we consider race as the real identity.  
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university there are similar proportions of White Caucasian and East Asian students, who 
together constitute around 90% of the student population. Hence, it is convenient to implement 
racial identity in the laboratory, and to recruit White and East Asian subjects, without raising 
suspicion – as almost all other experiments have similar racial compositions in subject cohorts. 
We sent recruitment emails only to East Asian and White subjects from the university subject-
database through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). We filtered using participants’ self-reported country 
of citizenship (Northern Europe, Western Europe, USA, Canada etc. for Whites; and China, 
Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan etc. for East Asians) and their name. The second 
criterion, name, filtered out students whose name do not seem to be one of the two racial 
categories (e.g. Latino students from the USA or British students of Indian origin). We 
recruited more subjects than required, and randomly chose 9 subjects from each race at the start 
of a session. The remaining recruited subjects received a turn-away fee. We also ensured that 
ethnically the subjects entering the laboratory are indeed Whites or East Asians. In only one 
case a Black student with Western name from the USA showed up and received a turn-away 
fee; we did not include her in that session.  
We employ three between-subject treatments and four sessions in each treatment. In the 
Baseline (no identity) treatment no information about the group composition is revealed. In the 
instructions we use phrases such as ‘your group’ and the ‘group you are matched with’. In the 
Color (‘classification’ or ‘minimal identity’) treatment the same experiment is run, but each 
group is arbitrarily given a different color code – either Green or Blue. The instructions in this 
treatment mention, at the beginning, that everyone in their group is of the same color code and 
that everyone in the group they are matched with is of the other color code. All the remaining 
parts of the instruction remain the same as in the Baseline. To test if there are any interactions 
between race and the color code, in half the Color sessions, East Asians were in the Green 
group while Caucasians were in the Blue group (Green-Blue). The color codes were reversed 
in the other half of the sessions (Blue-Green). In the Race (real identity) treatment the racial 
compositions of the groups are revealed. The subjects are informed at the beginning of the 
instructions that everyone in their group is of the same race and that everyone in the group they 
are matched with is of the other race. The remaining parts of the instruction stay the same as in 
the Baseline. The instructions are available in the Appendix. 
The experiment involved a total of 216 subjects who could participate in only one 
session. No subject had prior experience in participating in a contest or in an identity 
experiment. Sessions were computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and was run by an 
East-Asian and a White research assistant. At the beginning of each session, instructions were 
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handed out and were read aloud by an experimenter. No other information, including details of 
race, was disseminated. Subjects were required to answer a quiz before the experiment began. 
Each session lasted ~60 minutes and average earning per subject was ~16 GBP.  
3.2 Hypotheses 
Given the design and the discussions above, we construct the following hypotheses 
about behavior in the experiment. Whereas Hypotheses 1 and 2 come directly from Sen (2007); 
Hypothesis 3 comes as a corollary to his work. The effect of the salience of a particular identity 
might not be the same for all individuals, since their background, norm and other condition 
may affect the behavior. In our context, this means race-specific social norms may affect how 
individuals from a particular race react to the salience of race. However, there is no ex-ante 
reason to consider this effect to be stronger for a particular race. Hence we state a no-difference 
of the effects of identity across races in the last hypothesis.   
We test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 both at the group level as well as the individual 
level, and Hypothesis 3 at the individual level. 
Hypothesis 1 (Sen, 2007: Identity). Effort expended in the Race treatment is significantly 
higher than the effort expended in the Baseline treatment. 
Hypothesis 2 (Sen, 2007: Classification). Effort expended in the Color treatment is not 
significantly different from the effort expended in the Baseline treatment. 
Hypothesis 3 (Homogeneous effect). Change in individual effort expended between 
treatments is the same across racial groups. 
4. Results 
Each treatment has 72 subjects, but the subjects receive feedback on group efforts of their group 
and of the competing group after every period. Hence, each competing pair of groups 
(consisting of 6 subjects) forms an independent observation. We first test if a particular color 
has an effect on behavior in the Color treatment. We run a random-effects regression of 
individual efforts on a constant, one-period lagged own effort, one-period lagged effort of the 
rival group, a time trend and a color dummy and found no significant differences in behavior 
between these two color labels (p-value for the dummy = 0.372). Hence, in all our subsequent 
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analyses, we pool data from the Green-Blue and the Blue-Green sessions under the Color 
treatment. There are thus 12 independent observations in each treatment. 
4.1 Group-Level Analysis  
We first investigate if there are differences between the treatments at the group level before 
moving to an individual level analysis of the reasons for any treatment differences. Table 1 
presents summary statistics of the mean (averaged over all 20 periods) per-period group effort 
by competing pairs of groups.  
Table 1. Mean (St. Dev.) of Competing group pairs’ Efforts  
Treatment Baseline Color Race 
Average 
Standard Dev. 
34.869 
(13.161) 
38.006 
(9.607) 
46.008 
(17.401) 
 
Observe that the average effort in any treatment is higher than the effort predicted by 
the Nash equilibrium (10). Wilcoxon signed-rank tests confirm this result (p-value < 0.001 for 
all treatments). This, however, only reiterates the robust phenomenon that overdissipation, i.e., 
expending more effort than the Nash prediction, occurs in this type of contest experiments 
(Dechenaux et al., 2015). A more interesting observation arises when we compare the group 
efforts across treatments. Mean group efforts over all the 20 periods shows a monotonic 
increase from Baseline to Color to Race. Specifically, the increase from the Baseline to the 
Race treatment is from 34.869 ECUs to 46.008 ECUs, or an increase of 31.95%.   
To investigate if the patterns observed above are driven by behavior only in particular 
periods or in particular effort range, we plot the mean group efforts over periods (Figure 1) and 
their empirical CDFs over the effort range (Figure 2). For all treatments, overall efforts 
decrease over time, but still stay above the equilibrium effort (the red horizontal line in Fig. 1). 
Efforts are also distributed over the whole effort range, but the Race treatment seems to 
stochastically dominate the Baseline. Furthermore, the mean group efforts over period for each 
racial group shows similar pattern as in Figure 1; and so do the distributions of groups efforts 
for each racial group with Figure 2. Hence, we do not present the race specific figures. 
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Figure 1. Mean group effort over period by treatment  
 
Figure 2. Empirical CDFs of group effort  
           
Figure 1 reinstate that group efforts in the Race treatment are always higher than the 
efforts in the Baseline or in the Color treatments. The comparison between the Color and the 
Baseline treatments, however, is not that obvious. Efforts in the Color treatment remain higher 
than, although very close to, the efforts of the Baseline treatment. Figure 2 shows that while 
the efforts are distributed over the whole range, the effort levels are higher in the Race treatment 
compared to the Baseline and probably also to the Color.   
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1~4 5~8 9~12 13~16 17~20
G
ro
u
p
 C
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
Period
Baseline
Color
Race
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
0 40 80 120 160
Group contribution
Baseline Color Race
12 
 
We next test whether the differences noted above are statistically significant with a 
Kruskal-Wallis test. It confirms that the efforts distributions are different in the different 
treatments (p-value < 0.001). To further examine treatment differences and the direction of the 
differences, we first run pairwise Mann-Whitney tests at the group-pair level. It shows a 
significant difference at the 10% level between the Race and the Baseline treatments (p-value 
= 0.083), but no difference between the Color and the Baseline treatments (p-value = 0.326). 
We then run a panel random effects regression that uses multiple observations for each group, 
one for each period. The dependent variable is group 𝑔's effort in period 𝑡, and the independent 
variables are two treatment dummies for Race and Color. We also control for the group's own 
effort in the previous period, the other group's effort in the previous period and a time trend.  
In this equations (and also in the two similar equations later) we estimate robust 
standard errors clustered on independent competing pairs. The equations present regression 
estimates, and ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
Group effortgt =   10.811
*** + 3.088* Race + 0.747 Color           
       (2.340)      (1.646)           (1.311) 
      + 0.591*** Group effortg,t-1 + 0.156
*** Rival's Effortt-1 - 0.332
*** Period 
        (0.058)               (0.051)                             (0.085) 
No. of obs. = 1368. No. of groups = 72. No. of competing group-pairs (clusters) = 36.  
This regression confirms the observations above. The dummy for the Race treatment is 
positive and significant (p-value = 0.061) but the dummy for the Color treatment is not (p-
value = 0.569); groups expend about 3.1 ECUs more per period in the Race treatment than in 
the Baseline treatment. This gives our first result.  
Result 1: Group efforts are higher in the Race treatment than in the Baseline treatment. But 
there is no difference between group efforts in the Color and in the Baseline treatment. 
 Since efforts are contributed in the contest in order to overcome the opponent’s efforts 
and to win the prize, the efforts can be used as a measure of the level of conflict. Result 1 thus 
confirms Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 at a group level. First, introducing a real identity 
increased the level of conflict by a group. Second, introducing a minimal identity (classification) 
did not affect the level of conflict significantly. It can also be observed that group efforts are 
positively correlated to lagged own and opponent group efforts, and are negatively correlated 
to time trend. These again confirm earlier findings as in Abbink et al. (2010) that group efforts 
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decline over time and that efforts are increasing in their own past efforts and in those of the 
competing ones.  
This result, however, comes with a caveat. While the current design is enough to answer 
our specific research questions (Hypotheses 1 and 2) as coined by Sen (2007), the results cannot 
tease out the effects of identity on in-group cooperation versus out-group hate. Hence, the most 
we can conclude from these results is that a real identity has a direct effect on parochial altruism 
(Choi & Bowles, 2007; Halevy et al., 2008; Abbink et al., 2012, Weisel & Bohm, 2015, Weisel 
and Zultan, 2016). That is, the incremental effect of identity in conflict efforts can come either 
through an increase in group cooperation for the love of own group’s identity, or through an 
increase in hate for the other group’s identity. It is observed in the literature (as discussed in 
the introduction) that in a public good game an introduction of identity can indeed increase 
contribution due to in-group love. But to incur out-group hate, one will have to face a threat 
from the out-group (Weisel & Bohm, 2015). Since in the current design the prize is a group 
specific public good, and the efforts of the out-group reduce the likelihood of one’s obtaining 
the prize, both effects can be in action. Although it will not be an apples-to-apples comparison, 
one can compare the effect of identity in this setting with that in a public good game. It can be 
observed that an introduction of the real identity increased the effort level by about 32% in the 
current study (Table 1). Comparing this with the results of Solow and Kirkwood (2002, p. 408 
– both genders: Strangers vs. Community) who find about an 8% increase, or Charness et al. 
(2014, p. 328 – NoGrNoTy vs. GrNoTy) who find about a 26% increase in contribution in a 
public good game with the introduction of identity, 8  it appears that both components of 
parochial altruism are in effect in the current study. 
4.2 Individual-Level Analysis 
We next investigate the reasons for higher efforts in the Race treatment. To do so, one would 
have to analyze the data at an individual level. We are primarily interested in the overall level 
of effort exerted in the conflict. Note that, due to the public good nature of the prize, it is 
possible for the individual subjects to free-ride completely on group-members by expending 
zero effort, or partially by expending low effort. So, the increase in overall effort in the Race 
treatment can occur due to several reasons: either subjects are free-riding less under the Race 
treatment, or they are expending more efforts, or both. To investigate this, we first analyze free-
                                                          
8 We report these numbers only to provide an idea of the effect of identity in contests compared to a public good 
setting. There are other studies who either do not state explicitly the average effects (e.g. Eckel and Grossman, 
2005), or the setting is very different to make a comparison (e.g. Gumen, 2015) and we do not report them here.  
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riding, and then effort contingent upon not free riding. Establishing the effect of racial identity 
in both the cases, we return our focus to the overall effort level (including zero effort) and test 
whether Result 1 is robust across racial groups (Hypothesis 3). To do so, we analyze overall 
effort level at the individual level – for each of the racial groups.  
4.2.1 Effects of identity on individual free-riding and effort decisions 
We first study the extent of free-riding (expending zero efforts) by individual players 
in each treatment. Note that, each subject can free-ride once in a period, i.e., between 0 and 20 
times in the whole experiment of 20 periods. Figure 3 summarizes the instances of treatment-
wise free-riding by subjects through the empirical CDFs of the incidence of free riding. The 
horizontal axis in Figure 3 shows the number of times a subject can possibly free-ride, and the 
vertical axis shows the corresponding proportion of actual free riding by treatment. It can 
clearly be observed that the incidence of free-riding is less in the Race treatment compared to 
in the Baseline. But there does not appear to be a large difference in the incidence of free-riding 
between the Color and the Baseline treatment. 
Figure 3.  Empirical CDFs of the incidences of free-riding  
 
To test this observation of treatment effect statistically, we run an individual-level 
regression. Note that we can consider the 20 periods as 20 trials in which free-riding might or 
might not occur. In such a case a binomial regression would be the appropriate model to 
estimate. The dependent variable is the number of instances of free-riding by an individual 
whereas the independent variables are the Race and the Color treatment dummies, a dummy 
for East Asian and a dummy for females. The results are reported in Table 2.   
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Table 2. Binomial regression on the incidence of free-riding 
Dependent variable: Number of  
Free-ride by an individual 
Color 0.004 
 (0.050) 
Race -0.082* 
 (0.047) 
E. Asian 0.009 
 (0.034) 
Female -0.079* 
 (0.044) 
Constant 0.283*** 
 (0.052) 
Observations 216 
***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Figures in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. 
Table 2 above shows that compared to the Baseline, the incidences of free-ride declines 
in the Race treatment, but not in the Color treatment. The above results suggest that 
participation in conflict, in terms of reduction of free-riding, increases with the salience of a 
real identity but not of a classification. These findings, further supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2, 
are summarized in Result 2. 
Result 2: The incidence of free-riding is lower in the Race treatment than in the Baseline 
treatment. Color treatment does not show such a difference. 
Given the findings that overall efforts (including free riding) are higher and free-riding 
itself is lower in the Race treatment compared to the Baseline, it will be of interest to test 
whether the effort level, contingent upon not free-riding, is also higher in the Race treatment. 
To do so, we first examine individual effort levels by treatment; but consider only the cases in 
which an individual has spent a positive effort. The summary statistics are reported in Table 3. 
Not surprisingly, the number of instances of strictly positive contributions are higher in the 
Race treatment. Furthermore, whereas the increase in overall conflict effort (including zero 
effort) from Baseline to Race treatment was 31.95% (Table 1), conditional upon positive effort, 
this increase is from 15.369 ECUs to 18.434 ECUs, or 19.94%. Hence, the increase due to a 
reduction in free-riding is 12.01%. 
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Table 3. Individual effort level contingent upon positive effort  
 Baseline Color Race 
Mean 15.369 17.018 18.434 
St. Dev. (10.699) (11.717) (12.025) 
No. Obs 1,089 1,072 1,198 
 
To test whether the observation above is statistically significant we run a hurdle model in 
which the first decision is whether to spend positive effort, and the second decision is to decide 
upon the level of effort given that the effort is positive. Specifically, in the first stage a random 
effect Probit model and, in the second stage a random effect Tobit model is implemented. As 
expected, and as observed in the descriptive statistics above, in the second stage the Race 
treatment – even after controlling for no free-riding in the first stage – has a significant and 
positive effect on the effort level. The results are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
4.2.2 Identity and the overall individual level of conflict effort 
After establishing that identity reduces free-riding and increases effort contingent upon 
not free-riding, we now shift our focus back to the overall level of conflict. We analyze the 
effects of the treatments on the individual level of conflict first by each racial group and then 
by gender.9 In Table 4 we present means and standard deviations of individual efforts per 
period (including zero effort) for East Asian and White subjects.  
Table 4. Mean (St. Dev.) Individual Efforts per period separated by race 
 Baseline Color Race 
White 
11.539 11.510 14.788 
(11.454) (11.466) (12.269) 
    
East Asian 
11.707 13.828 15.885 
(11.367) (13.443) (13.592) 
All 
11.623 12.669 15.336 
(11.407) (12.543) (12.954) 
                                                          
9 We also test whether average group efforts between racial groups are different within treatment. We calculate 
differences of group efforts between paired groups and run a Wilcoxon signed rank test to test if this difference is 
zero. For all the treatments, we find no significant difference of bids between White and East Asian groups. 
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Table 4 shows that individual efforts are higher in the Race treatment than in the 
Baseline (15.336 ECUs vs. 11.669 ECUs). Overall, the effort in the Color treatment is not much 
higher (12.669 ECUs) than in the Baseline. Since individual effort decisions are not 
independent, it is not possible to run non-parametric tests aimed at race categories. Hence, we 
once again employ panel regressions to test if the overall treatment differences seen in Table 4 
are statistically significant. The equation below presents the estimates of an individual random 
effects regression of efforts on treatment dummies and controls. The additional independent 
variables are lagged effort of the rival group, the individual's one-period lagged effort, a time 
trend (period), and race and gender dummies.  
Individual effortit =   3.397
***+ 1.156** Race + 0.321 Color           
            (0.759)     (0.569)            (0.473) 
            + 0.547*** Own efforti,t-1 + 0.056
** Rival's Effortt-1 - 0.128
*** Period 
               (0.040)      (0.016)                             (0.027) 
            + 0.485 EastAsian+ 0.998**Female  
               (0.476)       (0.468) 
No. of obs. = 4104. No. of subjects = 216. No. of competing group-pairs (clusters) = 36.  
It can be clearly observed that the individual efforts are indeed higher in the Race 
treatment than in the Baseline; the treatment dummy is positive and significant at the 5% level. 
Subjects expend 1.16 ECUs more effort per period in the Race treatment than in the Baseline 
treatment. However, although the efforts in the Color treatment are higher than in the Baseline, 
the difference is not statistically significant. We then run three further regressions with pair-
wise treatment data – between Baseline and Race, Baseline and Color, and Race and Color 
treatments. The results are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. As can be seen from the table, 
the outcomes remain the same. These findings are summarized in the following result.  
Result 3: Individual efforts are higher in the Race treatment than in the Baseline treatment, 
but they are not higher in the Color treatment compared to the Baseline treatment. 
 Results 1, 2, and 3 provide formal support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 at a group as well as 
at an individual level. We now test Hypothesis 3, i.e., whether these results are robust across 
racial (and other demographic) groups.  
Note that the significant coefficients of lag effort of the rival group and lag effort of 
own group are potentially very useful to the interpretation of results as indicating rivalry and 
conflict. Namely, increases in effort as a reaction to higher effort of the rival, may suggest that 
subjects are not simply trying to determine the optimal level of effort. If the significance of 
18 
 
these coefficients are treatment dependent, then it can shed light on out-group hate versus in-
group love. To test this we run a random effect regression with two sets of interaction terms: 
treatment and lag effort of rival group, and treatment and lag effort of own group. We find that 
there is no significant difference between coefficients of lag choice of rival groups in either the 
Baseline or the Race treatments. Hence we cannot make definitive conclusions about subject 
behavior. The regression results are summarized in Table A4 in the Appendix.10  
Table 4 shows that the increase in efforts in the Race treatment is not very different 
between the two racial groups. Whereas East Asians increase efforts marginally for both types 
of identities, Whites increase efforts only in the real identity treatment but not in the minimal 
identity. The regression reported above suggest no significant difference in effort levels 
between the racial groups. This matches with our earlier finding (footnote 8) that average group 
efforts within treatment between the East Asian and the White group are not different. Note, 
however, that the regressions do not test for differences in effort levels between genders or 
racial groups in the different treatments. We investigate this issue below. 
Although the East Asian indicator is not significant, the coefficients for the Female 
indicator in the above equation is significant. But the regression does not specifically test for 
differences in effort levels between genders or racial groups in the different treatments. 
Therefore, we now investigate whether the effects of identities are heterogeneous across 
genders. To do so, first in Table 5 we present mean and standard deviation of individual bids 
by male and female in all treatments. 
Table 5. Mean (St. Dev.) Individual Efforts per period separated by gender 
  Baseline Color Race 
Male 
Mean 11.523 11.313 12.407 
St. Dev. 
No. Subjects 
(11.599) 
35 
(11.655) 
38 
(11.307) 
36 
Female 
Mean 11.718 14.184 18.265 
St. Dev. 
No. Subjects 
(11.229) 
37 
(13.312) 
34 
(13.814) 
36 
All 
Mean 11.623 12.669 15.336 
St. Dev. 
No. Subjects 
(11.407) 
72 
(12.543) 
72 
(12.954) 
72 
                                                          
10 We run several robustness checks with further specifications. We check whether the results are concentrated in 
a particular time period. As can be observed from Figure 1, we find that it is not the case and qualitative results 
remain the same. Moreover, we implemented own lag effort and lag of (own group – own individual) effort, and 
the treatment effects still remain the same. 
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The table suggests that higher efforts in the Race treatment are driven mainly by higher 
efforts by female subjects. Efforts of female subjects increase from 11.718 ECUs in the 
Baseline treatment to 18.265 ECUs in the Race treatment. Females expend more effort in the 
Color treatment (14.184 ECUs) than in the Baseline, but the increment is not as high. Males do 
not show such behavior. This is confirmed by the regression in the equation above: females 
expend about 1 ECU more effort than their male counterparts.  
We further investigate this gender effect by estimating an individual-level random 
effect panel regression with interaction between treatments and gender dummies. The 
dependent variable is once again individual efforts and the independent variables include those 
in the equation in the regression above along with the interaction terms.  
Individual effortit =   4.156
*** – 0.440 Baseline×female  – 0.559 Color×male           
            (0.664)     (0.485)                             (0.693) 
            + 0.745 Color×female – 0.140 Race×male + 1.995** Race×female 
              (0.816)              (0.710)                   (0.803) 
                + 0.057*** Own efforti,t-1 + 0.057
*** Rival's Effortt-1 - 0.130
*** Period 
               (0.016)       (0.038)                             (0.027) 
            + 0.556 EastAsian  
               (0.508)  
No. of obs. = 4104. No. of subjects = 216. No. of competing group-pairs (clusters) = 36.  
This regression shows that the higher individual efforts in the Race treatment are 
essentially driven by higher efforts expended by females in that treatment. Relative to males in 
the Baseline, females in the Race treatment expend significantly higher effort. The other 
controls show no difference in results from the previous analyses. We further investigate 
whether the higher effort of females in the Race treatment occurs due to an effect of real identity 
or whether it is merely a context-driven behavior (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). We include an 
interaction of female dummy with Race treatment in the regression above, which it turns out 
to be significant but the Color dummy interacting with genders remain insignificant. Hence, 
we conclude that identity itself induces higher efforts by females. 
We, again, run pairwise treatment effects regressions that are reported in Table A3 in 
the Appendix. These pairwise regressions reaffirm that the results hold for the Race treatment 
but not for the Color treatment. Additionally, it shows that females expend significantly higher 
effort in the Race treatment compared to the Color treatment. All these findings are summarized 
in the following result. 
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Result 4: The higher efforts in the Race treatment relative to those in the Baseline treatment 
are driven by the higher efforts expended by female subjects. Females also expend significantly 
higher effort in the Race treatment compared to the Color treatment. However, there is no 
significant difference in efforts expended by females between the Color and the Baseline 
treatment, neither there is any difference in effort expended by racial groups. 
Result 4 allows one to reject Hypothesis 3 in the dimension of gender, and asserts that 
although the conflict behavior are robust across racial groups, it is not so across gender. This 
result, that females’ increment in effort due to the revelation of identity is higher than their 
male counterparts, is apparently puzzling. This is because in war, terrorism etc. we expect to 
see the opposite. This, however, conforms to the general observations of higher effort exertion 
by females in contests (Price and Sheremeta, 2015), that females are more prone to the winner’s 
curse (Casari et al., 2007), and that identity brings in more competitiveness among females in 
a laboratory setting (Cadsby et al., 2013). Moreover, this matches the existing general 
observation that there are differences between the decisions of men and those of women (Eckel 
and Grossman, 2008).  
More importantly, although female participation is not often observed in physical 
conflicts such as war or riots, it is still possible to find external validation for our result. It is 
well understood in the Psychology literature that males are more aggressive and competitive in 
situations in which the conflict is physical and can sustain physical harm. But in non-physical 
conflict situations females are either more aggressive than their male counterparts or there is 
no significant gender difference (Eagly and Steffen, 1986; Bjorkqvist, 1994; Hyde, 2005). 
Since a laboratory contest game reflects a frame of conflict without inflicting physical harm, it 
enables females to be more aggressive in this game than male subjects. Combining this with 
the evidence that group identity has stronger effects on female contributions (Croson et al., 
2008), we believe that the current results can explain incremental verbal hostility, non-physical 
intimidation, violation of norms by females when group identity becomes prominent. 
5. Discussion 
We investigate the effects of identity and classification in group conflicts in an experimental 
setting. We employ a group contest with no identity, real racial identity and a minimal identity 
(classification) and find that compared to Baseline conflict is significantly higher in the real 
identity treatment but not in the minimal identity treatment. This is due to both initiation (less 
free-riding) and escalation (expending more effort) of conflict in the real identity case. Hence, 
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we provide a direct empirical test of the hypotheses coined by Sen (2007) that (i) the salience 
of a real identity can initiate and escalate conflict; but (ii) that of a classification will not do so 
and find support for both. Adding to his hypotheses, we find that the increase in conflict in a 
laboratory contest setting does not arise due to the behavior of a particular race, but due to the 
increase in efforts by females across racial groups in this setting.  
These results contribute to the literature on conflict and as well as to the literature on 
identity. Existing identity studies rely on experiments on ‘conflict of interest’ to analyze 
conflict. Our experiment pushes that front in a laboratory setting, and provides specific results. 
To our knowledge, this is also the first study in the identity literature that examines the effects 
of the ‘levels’ of identity (none to classification to real) on human behavior. We add to the 
conflict literature by including identity in a controlled setting. These results also add to the 
existing literature on the competitiveness of females (Apesteguia et al., 2012; Cadsby et al., 
2013; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 2011), that has thus far shown mixed results. 
 The results, however, leave some open issues. First, as mentioned, the results cannot 
tease out the effects of identity on in-group love versus out-group hate and we conclude that a 
real identity has a direct effect on parochial altruism.11 Second, we have implemented a specific 
definition of classification as introduced by Sen (2007). However, he also mentions that when 
a classification “acquires derivative relevance”, then it might have similar effect as an identity. 
Borrowing an example from Sen (2007), the time of birth is only a classification. But if some 
dictator decides to kill all people born on a particular time of the day, then a salience of that 
classification will acquire serious relevance and will have similar effects as identity. Our 
experiment is not designed to capture this concept. Third, it is not possible to certainly 
extrapolate and generalize the results to all races beyond the two involved in this experiment. 
Specifically, the quantitative results might change due to norms and cultures if different races 
are considered and it is an empirical question as to whether the results generalize. Finally, as 
discussed earlier, the specific laboratory experiment boils down to situations in which the 
conflict is non-physical. As a result, the external validation of the results will have to be in the 
correct context.  
Quite a few of the caveats stated above can be implemented in future research. But 
many other interesting extensions are also possible. The results seem to be specifically 
                                                          
11 We tested whether individual efforts in the real identity treatment ever go beyond the level such that, if their 
own group wins, they will earn exactly the same as if they don’t contribute at all. This would suggest that beating 
the other group has an intrinsic value beyond within-group efficiency. There are only 28 out of 216 individuals 
who exert effort more than that level at least in one round and the number is only 8 if we consider those who did 
so in 3 or more rounds.  
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interesting since there is no pre-existing conflict between Whites and East Asians in the UK. 
But it will also be intriguing to see the effects when the same experiment is run between groups 
that have pre-existing conflicts. A lab-in-the-field experiment will help in such a case. Another 
extension would be to explore if different dimensions of identity have different effects on 
behavior. For example, it would be interesting to see if the results stated above can be 
generalized to other races or languages or political affiliation and whether Hypothesis 3 
(symmetric effect across races) can then be rejected. Since we found gender effects, an obvious 
extension could be to replicate our experiment with controlled gender ratio. It would be useful 
to run an individual contest experiment that does not have the issues of in-group cooperation 
or free-riding. Finally, identifying mechanisms through which conflict intensity can be reduced 
will be a further important extension. 
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Appendix I: Tables 
Table A1. Hurdle model of effort level contingent upon no free-ride 
1st stage : Random Effect Probit model 
Dependent variable: #  Free-ride 
Color 0.095 
 (0.229) 
Race 0.402* 
 (0.225) 
E. Asian 0.053 
 (0.140) 
Female 0.361* 
 (0.192) 
Constant 0.825*** 
 (0.185) 
# of Obs.     4,320 
# of subjects 216 
2nd stage : Random Effect Tobit model 
Dependent variable:  Efforti,t 
Color 0.919 
 (0.983) 
Race 1.601* 
 (0.969) 
Lag rival effort 0.060*** 
 (0.008) 
Lag own effort 0.267*** 
 (0.017) 
Period -0.258*** 
 (0.030) 
E. Asian 0.614 
 (0.803) 
Female 0.827 
 (0.804) 
Constant 11.061*** 
 (1.056) 
# of Obs.     3,165 
# of subjects 207 
***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Figures in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. 
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Table A2. Determinants of individual efforts  
Dep variable: 
Efforti,t 
          All 
Baseline + 
Color 
Baseline + 
Race 
Color +   
Race 
Color 0.321 0.343   
 (0.473) (0.548)   
Race 1.156**  1.030** 0.813 
 (0.569)  (0.508) (0.517) 
     
Lag rival effort 0.056** 0.042* 0.082*** 0.046*** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.012) (0.018) 
Lag own effort 0.547*** 0.546*** 0.502*** 0.579*** 
 (0.040) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) 
Period -0.128*** -0.124*** -0.128*** -0.135*** 
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.027) (0.033) 
     
E. Asian 0.485 0.454 0.325 0.657 
 (0.476) (0.581) (0.508) (0.637) 
Female 0.998** 0.450 0.879* 1.558*** 
 (0.468) (0.605) (0.532) (0.553) 
Constant 3.397*** 4.176*** 3.143*** 3.415*** 
 (0.759) (0.791) (0.823) (0.962) 
# of Obs.     4,104 2,736 2,736 2,736 
# of subjects 216 144 144 144 
   ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Figures in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. 
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Table A3. Effects of Gender  
Dependent 
variable: Efforti,t 
          All Baseline vs.   
Color 
Baseline vs. 
Race 
Color vs. Race 
Baseline×female -0.440 -0.371 -0.491  
 (0.485) (0.499) (0.554)  
Color×male -0.559 -0.480   
 (0.693) (0.721)   
Color×female 0.745 0.813  1.121 
 (0.816) (0.844)  (0.975) 
Race×male -0.140  -0.343 0.400 
 (0.710)  (0.711) (0.762) 
Race×female 1.995**  1.921** 2.389*** 
 (0.803)  (0.769) (0.743) 
     
Lag rival effort 0.057*** 0.044* 0.083*** 0.046*** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.012) (0.018) 
Lag own effort 0.543*** 0.544*** 0.495*** 0.578*** 
 (0.038) (0.045) (0.043) (0.047) 
     
Period -0.130*** -0.123*** -0.132*** -0.137*** 
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.027) (0.033) 
     
E. Asian 0.556 0.426 0.463 0.716 
 (0.508) (0.605) (0.566) (0.655) 
     
Constant 4.156*** 4.557*** 3.893*** 3.653*** 
 (0.664) (0.806) (0.653) (0.887) 
N 4,104 2,736 2,736 2,736 
***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Figures in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. 
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Table A4. Random effects regression with interactions 
Dependent variable:  Efforti,t 
Baseline* Lag rival effort 0.082*** 
 (0.021) 
  
Color* Lag rival effort 0.0240 
 (0.025) 
  
Race* Lag rival effort 0.0731*** 
 (0.015) 
  
Baseline* Lag own effort 0.440*** 
 (0.051) 
  
Color* Lag own effort 0.618*** 
 (0.059) 
  
Race* Lag own effort 0.545*** 
 (0.065) 
  
Period -0.128*** 
 (0.027) 
  
E. Asian 0.409 
 (0.424) 
  
Female 0.855** 
 (0.426) 
  
Constant 3.987*** 
 (0.642) 
Observations 4104 
***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Figures in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. 
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Appendix II: Instructions 
Instructions for the Baseline Treatment 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The instructions are simple.  If you 
follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of 
money. 
 
Experimental Currency is used in the experiment and your decisions and earnings will be 
recorded in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). At the end of today’s experiment, you will 
be paid in private and in cash. ECUs will be converted to Pound Sterling at a rate of _25_ ECUs 
to _1_ British Pound.  
 
It is extremely important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you 
have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter 
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you 
will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS  
 
YOUR DECISION 
The experiment consists of 20 decision-making periods. At the beginning of the experiment, 
you will be anonymously placed into a group of 3 people. Your group will then be 
anonymously matched with another group of 3 people. In each period your group as well as 
the group your group is matched with will remain the same. However, at no point will you 
know who your group members are or who the members of the other group are. Also, you will 
not know any information about the members of your group or the members of the other group.  
 
Each period you will be given an initial endowment of 60 ECUs. You will then decide how 
much to allocate to a group account or an individual account. On your screen, you will be 
asked to enter your allocation to the group account. You may allocate any integer number of 
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ECUs between, and including, 0 and 60. Any ECUs you do not allocate to the group account 
will automatically be allocated to your individual account. An example of your decision screen 
is shown below.   
 
 
At the end of each period, either your group or the other group will receive a reward of 120 
ECUs (40 ECUs per group member). In each period, only one of the two groups can obtain the 
reward. By contributing to your group account you increase the chance of receiving the reward 
for your group. If the total number of ECUs in your group account exceeds the total number of 
ECUs in the other group’s account, your group has a higher chance of receiving the reward.  
 
The computer will assign the reward either to your group or to the other group, via a random 
draw that depends on the total allocation in the group accounts by the two groups. Below is a 
hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer makes a random draw to decide 
which group wins the reward.  
Note: The following example is for illustrative purposes only. 
Example 1. Random Draw 
Think of the random draw in the following way. For each ECUs in your group’s account the 
computer puts 1 red token into a box and for each ECU in the other group’s account the 
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computer puts 1 black token. Then the computer randomly draws one token out of the box. If 
the drawn token is red then your group receives the reward, if the drawn token is black then 
the other group receives the reward. Suppose that members of both groups have allocated their 
ECUs in the following way (as shown in Table 1 below). 
 
Table 1 – Allocation of ECUs by members of both groups 
Your 
Group 
Endow-
ment 
(ECUs) 
Allocation 
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation 
to the 
group 
account 
 
Other 
Group 
Endow-
ment 
(ECUs) 
Allocation 
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation 
to the 
group 
account 
Person 1 60 40 20 
 
Person 1 60 50 10 
Person 2 60 45 15 Person 2 60 60 0 
Person 3 60 50 10 Person 3 60 55 5 
Total 180 135 45 
 
Total 180 165 15 
 
 
Members of your group have allocated a total of 45 ECUs to your group account while 
members of the other group have allocated 15 ECUs. Thus, the computer will place 45 red 
tokens and 15 black tokens into the box (60 tokens total). Then the computer will randomly 
draw one token out of the box. You can see that since your group has contributed more it has 
a higher chance of receiving the reward - your group will receive the reward 45 out of 60 
times. The other group has a lower chance of receiving the reward - 15 out of 60 times. 
 
A group can never guarantee itself the reward. However, by increasing your contribution, you 
can increase your group’s chance of receiving the reward. If your group receives the reward, 
120 ECUs will be divided equally among the members of your group, i.e., you and the other 2 
members of your group will receive 40 ECUs each.  
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YOUR EARNINGS  
EARNINGS IN EACH PERIOD: 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated.  
 
1) For each ECU in your individual account, you will earn 1 ECU in return. So, if you 
keep all 60 ECUs that you are endowed with in your individual account you will 
earn 60 ECUs.  
 
2) You can also earn some ECUs from your group account. After all contributions are 
made, the computer uses the random draw process described above to decide which 
group wins the reward. If your group wins the reward, you will earn 40 ECUs from 
your group account in addition to your earnings from your individual account. Each 
of the other 2 members of your group will also earn 40 ECUs from the group 
account. If the other group wins the reward, you and the other 2 members of your 
group receive nothing from your group account. In this event, your period earnings 
will be equal to your earnings from your individual account. 
 
Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from your individual account and the 
earnings from your group account. The following example illustrates the calculation of period 
earnings.  
 
Note: The following example is for illustrative purposes only. 
 
Example 2. Period Earnings 
In Example 1, your group allocated a total of 45 ECUs while other group allocated a total of 
15 ECUs to the group accounts. Let’s say the computer made a random draw and your group 
received the reward. Thus, all the members of your group receive 40 ECUs each from your 
group account plus earnings from their individual accounts. All members of the other group 
receive earnings only from their individual accounts, since their group did not receive the 
reward. The calculation of the total earnings is shown in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2 – Calculation of earnings for both groups 
Your 
group 
Earnings 
from 
group 
account 
Earnings 
from 
individual 
account 
Total period 
earnings 
 
Other 
group 
Earnings 
from 
group 
account 
Earnings 
from 
individual 
account 
Total 
period 
earnings 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
40 
40 
40 
40 
45 
50 
40+40 = 80 
40+45   = 85 
40+50   = 90 
 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
0 
0 
0 
50 
60 
55 
50 
60 
55 
Total 120 135 255  Total 0 165 165 
 
 
EARNINGS FROM THE EXPERIMENT:  
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 20 periods for actual payment 
using a computer program. You will be paid the sum of the earnings in each of these 5 periods.  
These earnings will be converted to cash at the exchange rate mentioned earlier and will be 
paid at the end of the experiment. 
 
 
Note: All participants in this session will be paid for the same 5 periods.  
 
OUTCOME SCREEN 
At the end of each period, the total number of ECUs in the two groups’ accounts, which group 
received the reward, your earnings from your individual and your group accounts, and your 
total earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Please record 
your results for the period on your record sheet under the appropriate heading. 
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QUESTIONS TO HELP YOU BETTER UNDERSTAND THE DECISION TASKS 
When everyone has finished reading the instructions, and before the experiment begins, we 
will ask you a few questions regarding the decisions you will make in the experiment. The 
questions will help you understand the calculation of your earnings and ensure that you have 
understood the instructions.  
 
 
 
 
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS? 
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Personal Record Sheet  
 
Period 
Earnings from 
individual account 
Earnings from 
your group 
account 
Total  earnings 
for this period 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
7    
8    
9    
10    
11    
12    
13    
14    
15    
16    
17    
18    
19    
20    
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Total Earnings 
 
 
 
Period Chosen Total earnings for this period 
  
  
  
  
  
Total = 
 
 
 
 
 
Sum earnings from table above:      
 
Divide earnings by conversion rate:      25  
 
Earnings in British Pounds:    £    (1) 
 
Earnings from Showing up:   £2    (2) 
 
Total payment received: (1)+(2)  £   
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QUIZ  
1. Does group composition change across periods in the experiment?   
Ans.       Yes            No    
 
 
Questions 2 to 6 apply to the following information. 
In a given period, suppose the members of your group and the other group chose to allocate 
their ECUs to the group account as it is shown in the table below. 
Your 
group 
Endow- 
ment 
Allocation  
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to the 
group  
account 
 
Other 
group 
Endow- 
ment 
Allocation  
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to the 
group  
account 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
60 
60 
60 
35 
60 
55 
25 
0 
5 
 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
60 
60 
60 
40 
40 
50 
20 
20 
10 
Total 180 150 30  Total 180 130 50 
 
 
2.  How many total ECUs will the computer place into the box?    
Ans. ___________ 
 
 
3.  If the computer makes a random draw out of the box what is the chance of your group 
receiving the reward?    
Ans.       _______    out of  ________ 
 
 
4.  If the computer makes a random draw out of the box what is the chance of the other group 
receiving the reward?    
Ans.       _______    out of  ________ 
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5.  If you are Person 1 in your group and your group did not receive the reward what are your 
period earnings?  
Ans. ___________ 
 
 
6.  If you are Person 2 in your group and your group received the reward what are your period 
earnings?  
Ans. ___________ 
 
 
EXPLANATIONS FOR QUIZ ANSWERS  
 
1. Does group composition change across periods in the experiment? Correct answer: No 
 
Questions 2 to 6 apply to the following information. 
In a given period, suppose the members of your group and the other group chose to allocate 
their ECUs to the group account as it is shown in the table below. 
Your 
group 
Endow- 
ment 
Allocation  
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to the 
group  
account 
 
Other 
group 
Endow- 
ment 
Allocation  
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to the 
group  
account 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
60 
60 
60 
35 
60 
55 
25 
0 
5 
 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
60 
60 
60 
40 
40 
50 
20 
20 
10 
Total 180 150 30  Total 180 130 50 
 
 
 
42 
 
2.  How many total ECUs will the computer place into the box?   Correct answer: 80  
Allocation to the group account by your group and by the other group, i.e., 30 from your group 
PLUS 50 from the other group.   
 
3.  If the computer makes a random draw out of the box what is the chance of your group 
receiving the reward?   – Correct answer: 30 out of 80 
Out of a total of 80 tokens, 30 belong to your group. Thus the chance of your group winning 
any random draw of one token from the box is 30 tokens out of 80.  
 
4.  If the computer makes a random draw out of the box what is the chance of the other group 
receiving the reward?  – Correct answer: 50 out of 80 
Out of a total of 80 tokens, 50 belong to the other group. Thus the chance of the other group 
winning any random draw of one token from the box is 50 tokens out of 80.  
 
5.  If you are Person 1 in your group and your group did not receive the reward what are your 
period earnings?  Correct answer: 35 
Since your group did not win the reward, your earnings from the group account for this period 
are zero. So, your period earnings are equal to your earnings from your individual account. 
From the above table, this is equal to 35 ECUs, your allocation to your individual account. 
 
6.  If you are Person 2 in your group and your group received the reward what are your period 
earnings?  Correct answer: 100 
Since your group did win the reward, your earnings from the group account for this period are 
40 ECUs (Your group wins 120 ECUs which are split equally among all 3 of you). So, your 
period earnings are equal to your earnings from your individual account plus 40 ECUs (your 
earnings from the group account). From the above table, your allocation to your individual 
account is 60. Thus your total period earnings are 60 + 40 = 100 ECUs. 
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Instructions for the Color Treatment 
 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The instructions are simple.  If you 
follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of 
money. 
Experimental Currency is used in the experiment and your decisions and earnings will be 
recorded in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). At the end of today’s experiment, you will 
be paid in private and in cash. ECUs will be converted to Pound Sterling at a rate of _25_ ECUs 
to _1_ British Pound.  
It is extremely important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you 
have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter 
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you 
will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
 
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS  
YOUR DECISION 
The experiment consists of 20 decision-making periods. At the beginning of the experiment, 
you will be anonymously placed into a group of 3 people. You will be placed in either a ‘Green’ 
group or a ‘Blue’ group. Your group will then be anonymously matched with another group of 
3 people. If you are placed into a Blue group, then your group will be matched with a Green 
group. If you are placed into a Green group, then your group will be matched with a Blue group. 
In each period your group as well as the group your group is matched with will remain the 
same. However, at no point will you know who your group members are or who the members 
of the other group are. Also, you will not know any information about the members of your 
group or the members of the other group.  
Each period you will be given an initial endowment of 60 ECUs. You will then decide how 
much to allocate to a group account or an individual account. On your screen, you will be 
asked to enter your allocation to the group account. You may allocate any integer number of 
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ECUs between, and including, 0 and 60. Any ECUs you do not allocate to the group account 
will automatically be allocated to your individual account. An example of your decision screen 
is shown below.   
 
At the end of each period, either your group or the other group will receive a reward of 120 
ECUs (40 ECUs per group member). In each period, only one of the two groups can obtain the 
reward. By contributing to your group account you increase the chance of receiving the reward 
for your group. If the total number of ECUs in your group account exceeds the total number of 
ECUs in the other group’s account, your group has a higher chance of receiving the reward.  
The computer will assign the reward either to your group or to the other group, via a random 
draw that depends on the total allocation in the group accounts by the two groups. Below is a 
hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer makes a random draw to decide 
which group wins the reward.  
Note: The following example is for illustrative purposes only. 
Example 1. Random Draw 
Think of the random draw in the following way. For each ECUs in your group’s account the 
computer puts 1 red token into a box and for each ECU in the other group’s account the 
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computer puts 1 black token. Then the computer randomly draws one token out of the box. If 
the drawn token is red then your group receives the reward, if the drawn token is black then 
the other group receives the reward. Suppose that members of both groups have allocated their 
ECUs in the following way (as shown in Table 1 below). 
 
Table 1 – Allocation of ECUs by members of both groups 
Your 
Group 
Endow-
ment 
(ECUs) 
Allocation 
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation 
to the 
group 
account 
 
Other 
Group 
Endow
-ment 
(ECUs) 
Allocation 
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation 
to the 
group 
account 
Person 1 60 40 20  Person 1 60 50 10 
Person 2 60 45 15 Person 2 60 60 0 
Person 3 60 50 10 Person 3 60 55 5 
Total 180 135 45  Total 180 165 15 
 
Members of your group have allocated a total of 45 ECUs to your group account while 
members of the other group have allocated 15 ECUs. Thus, the computer will place 45 red 
tokens and 15 black tokens into the box (60 tokens total). Then the computer will randomly 
draw one token out of the box. You can see that since your group has contributed more it has 
a higher chance of receiving the reward - your group will receive the reward 45 out of 60 
times. The other group has a lower chance of receiving the reward - 15 out of 60 times. 
A group can never guarantee itself the reward. However, by increasing your bid, you can 
increase your group’s chance of receiving the reward. If your group receives the reward, 120 
ECUs will be divided equally among the members of your group, i.e., you and the other 2 
members of your group will receive 40 ECUs each.  
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YOUR EARNINGS  
EARNINGS IN EACH PERIOD: 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated.  
3) For each ECU in your individual account, you will earn 1 ECU in return. So, if you 
keep all 60 ECUs that you are endowed with in your individual account you will earn 
60 ECUs.  
 
4) You can also earn some ECUs from your group account. After all bids are made, the 
computer uses the random draw process described above to decide which group wins 
the reward. If your group wins the reward, you will earn 40 ECUs from your group 
account in addition to your earnings from your individual account. Each of the other 2 
members of your group will also earn 40 ECUs from the group account. If the other 
group wins the reward, you and the other 2 members of your group receive nothing 
from your group account. In this event, your period earnings will be equal to your 
earnings from your individual account. 
 
Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from your individual account and the 
earnings from your group account. The following example illustrates the calculation of period 
earnings.  
Note: The following example is for illustrative purposes only. 
 
Example 2. Period Earnings 
In Example 1, your group allocated a total of 45 ECUs while other group allocated a total of 
15 ECUs to the group accounts. Let’s say the computer made a random draw and your group 
received the reward. Thus, all the members of your group receive 40 ECUs each from your 
group account plus earnings from their individual accounts. All members of the other group 
receive earnings only from their individual accounts, since their group did not receive the 
reward. The calculation of the total earnings is shown in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2 – Calculation of earnings for both groups 
Your 
group 
Earnings 
from 
group 
account 
Earnings 
from 
individual 
account 
Total period 
earnings 
 
Other 
group 
Earnings 
from 
group 
account 
Earnings 
from 
individual 
account 
Total 
period 
earnings 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
40 
40 
40 
40 
45 
50 
40+40 = 80 
40+45   = 85 
40+50   = 90 
 Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
0 
0 
0 
50 
60 
55 
50 
60 
55 
Total 120 135 255  Total 0 165 165 
 
EARNINGS FROM THE EXPERIMENT:  
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 20 periods for actual payment 
using a computer program. You will be paid the sum of the earnings in each of these 5 periods.  
These earnings will be converted to cash at the exchange rate mentioned earlier and will be 
paid at the end of the experiment. 
 
Note: All participants in this session will be paid for the same 5 periods.  
OUTCOME SCREEN 
At the end of each period, the total number of ECUs in the two groups’ accounts, which group 
received the reward, your earnings from your individual and your group accounts, and your 
total earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Please record 
your results for the period on your record sheet under the appropriate heading. 
  
48 
 
 
 
QUESTIONS TO HELP YOU BETTER UNDERSTAND THE DECISION TASKS 
When everyone has finished reading the instructions, and before the experiment begins, we 
will ask you a few questions regarding the decisions you will make in the experiment. The 
questions will help you understand the calculation of your earnings and ensure that you have 
understood the instructions.  
 
 
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS? 
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Personal Record Sheet  
 
Period 
Earnings from 
individual account 
Earnings from 
your group 
account 
Total  earnings 
for this period 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
7    
8    
9    
10    
11    
12    
13    
14    
15    
16    
17    
18    
19    
20    
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
Total Earnings 
 
Period Chosen Total earnings for this period 
  
  
  
  
  
Total = 
 
Sum earnings from table above:      
Divide earnings by conversion rate:      25  
 
Earnings in British Pounds:    £    (1) 
Earnings from Showing up:   £2    (2) 
 
Total payment received: (1)+(2)  £   
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QUIZ  
2. Does group composition change across periods in the experiment?   
Ans.       Yes            No    
 
Questions 2 to 6 apply to the following information. 
In a given period, suppose the members of your group and the other group chose to allocate 
their ECUs to the group account as it is shown in the table below. 
Your 
group 
Endow- 
ment 
Allocation  
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to the 
group  
account 
 
Other 
group 
Endow- 
ment 
Allocation  
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to the 
group  
account 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
60 
60 
60 
35 
60 
55 
25 
0 
5 
 Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
60 
60 
60 
40 
40 
50 
20 
20 
10 
Total 180 150 30  Total 180 130 50 
 
2.  How many total ECUs will the computer place into the box?    
Ans. ___________ 
 
3.  If the computer makes a random draw out of the box what is the chance of your group 
receiving the reward?    
Ans.       _______    out of  ________ 
 
4.  If the computer makes a random draw out of the box what is the chance of the other group 
receiving the reward?    
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Ans.       _______    out of  ________ 
 
5.  If you are Person 1 in your group and your group did not receive the reward what are your 
period earnings?  
Ans. ___________ 
 
6.  If you are Person 2 in your group and your group received the reward what are your period 
earnings?  
Ans. ___________ 
EXPLANATIONS FOR QUIZ ANSWERS  
 
2. Does group composition change across periods in the experiment? Correct answer: No 
 
Questions 2 to 6 apply to the following information. 
In a given period, suppose the members of your group and the other group chose to allocate 
their ECUs to the group account as it is shown in the table below. 
Your 
group 
Endow- 
ment 
Allocation  
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to the 
group  
account 
 
Other 
group 
Endow- 
ment 
Allocation  
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to the 
group  
account 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
60 
60 
60 
35 
60 
55 
25 
0 
5 
 Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
60 
60 
60 
40 
40 
50 
20 
20 
10 
Total 180 150 30  Total 180 130 50 
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2.  How many total ECUs will the computer place into the box?   Correct answer: 80  
Allocation to the group account by your group and by the other group, i.e., 30 from your group 
PLUS 50 from the other group.  
  
3.  If the computer makes a random draw out of the box what is the chance of your group 
receiving the reward?   – Correct answer: 30 out of 80 
Out of a total of 80 tokens, 30 belong to your group. Thus the chance of your group winning 
any random draw of one token from the box is 30 tokens out of 80.  
 
4.  If the computer makes a random draw out of the box what is the chance of the other group 
receiving the reward?  – Correct answer: 50 out of 80 
Out of a total of 80 tokens, 50 belong to the other group. Thus the chance of the other group 
winning any random draw of one token from the box is 50 tokens out of 80.  
 
5.  If you are Person 1 in your group and your group did not receive the reward what are your 
period earnings?  Correct answer: 35 
Since your group did not win the reward, your earnings from the group account for this period 
are zero. So, your period earnings are equal to your earnings from your individual account. 
From the above table, this is equal to 35 ECUs, your allocation to your individual account. 
 
6.  If you are Person 2 in your group and your group received the reward what are your period 
earnings?  Correct answer: 100 
Since your group did win the reward, your earnings from the group account for this period are 
40 ECUs (Your group wins 120 ECUs which are split equally among all 3 of you). So, your 
period earnings are equal to your earnings from your individual account plus 40 ECUs (your 
earnings from the group account). From the above table, your allocation to your individual 
account is 60. Thus your total period earnings are 60 + 40 = 100 ECUs. 
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Instructions for the Race treatment 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The instructions are simple.  If you 
follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of 
money. 
 
Experimental Currency is used in the experiment and your decisions and earnings will be 
recorded in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). At the end of today’s experiment, you will 
be paid in private and in cash. ECUs will be converted to Pound Sterling at a rate of _25_ ECUs 
to _1_ British Pound.  
 
It is extremely important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you 
have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter 
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you 
will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS  
 
YOUR DECISION 
The experiment consists of 20 decision-making periods. At the beginning of the experiment, 
you will be anonymously placed into a group of 3 people. You will be placed in either an ‘East 
Asian’ group or a ‘Caucasian-White’ group. If you are placed in an East Asian group, all 3 
members of your group will be East Asian. If you are placed in a Caucasian-White group, all 
3 members of your group will be Caucasian-White. Your group will then be anonymously 
matched with another group of 3 people. If you are placed into a Caucasian-White group, then 
your group will be matched with an East Asian group. If you are placed into an East Asian 
group, then your group will be matched with a Caucasian-White group. In each period your 
group as well as the group your group is matched with will remain the same. However, at no 
point will you know who your group members are or who the members of the other group are. 
Also, you will not know any other information about the members of your group or the 
members of the other group.  
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Each period you will be given an initial endowment of 60 ECUs. You will then decide how 
much to allocate to a group account or an individual account. On your screen, you will be 
asked to enter your allocation to the group account. You may allocate any integer number of 
ECUs between, and including, 0 and 60. Any ECUs you do not allocate to the group account 
will automatically be allocated to your individual account. An example of your decision screen 
is shown below.   
 
 
 
At the end of each period, either your group or the other group will receive a reward of 120 
ECUs (40 ECUs per group member). In each period, only one of the two groups can obtain the 
reward. By contributing to your group account you increase the chance of receiving the reward 
for your group. If the total number of ECUs in your group account exceeds the total number of 
ECUs in the other group’s account, your group has a higher chance of receiving the reward.  
 
The computer will assign the reward either to your group or to the other group, via a random 
draw that depends on the total allocation in the group accounts by the two groups. Below is a 
hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer makes a random draw to decide 
which group wins the reward.  
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Note: The following example is for illustrative purposes only. 
 
Example 1. Random Draw 
Think of the random draw in the following way. For each ECU in your group’s account the 
computer puts 1 red token into a box and for each ECU in the other group’s account the 
computer puts 1 black token. Then the computer randomly draws one token out of the box. If 
the drawn token is red then your group receives the reward, if the drawn token is black then 
the other group receives the reward. Suppose that members of both groups have allocated their 
ECUs in the following way (as shown in Table 1 below). 
 
Table 1 – Allocation of ECUs by members of both groups 
Your 
Group 
Endow-
ment 
(ECUs) 
Allocation 
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation 
to the 
group 
account 
 
Other 
Group 
Endow-
ment 
(ECUs) 
Allocation 
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation 
to the 
group 
account 
Person 1 60 40 20 
 
Person 1 60 50 10 
Person 2 60 45 15 Person 2 60 60 0 
Person 3 60 50 10 Person 3 60 55 5 
Total 180 135 45 
 
Total 180 165 15 
 
Members of your group have allocated a total of 45 ECUs to your group account while 
members of the other group have allocated 15 ECUs. Thus, the computer will place 45 red 
tokens and 15 black tokens into the box (60 tokens total). Then the computer will randomly 
draw one token out of the box. You can see that since your group has contributed more it has 
a higher chance of receiving the reward - your group will receive the reward 45 out of 60 
times. The other group has a lower chance of receiving the reward - 15 out of 60 times. 
 
A group can never guarantee itself the reward. However, by increasing your contribution, you 
can increase your group’s chance of receiving the reward. If your group receives the reward, 
120 ECUs will be divided equally among the members of your group, i.e., you and the other 2 
members of your group will receive 40 ECUs each.  
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YOUR EARNINGS  
EARNINGS IN EACH PERIOD: 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated.  
 
1) For each ECU in your individual account, you will earn 1 ECU in return. So, if you 
keep all 60 ECUs that you are endowed with in your individual account you will 
earn 60 ECUs.  
 
2) You can also earn some ECUs from your group account. After all contributions are 
made, the computer uses the random draw process described above to decide which 
group wins the reward. If your group wins the reward, you will earn 40 ECUs from 
your group account in addition to your earnings from your individual account. Each 
of the other 2 members of your group will also earn 40 ECUs from the group 
account. If the other group wins the reward, you and the other 2 members of your 
group receive nothing from your group account. In this event, your period earnings 
will be equal to your earnings from your individual account. 
 
Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from your individual account and the 
earnings from your group account. The following example illustrates the calculation of period 
earnings.  
 
Note: The following example is for illustrative purposes only. 
 
 
Example 2. Period Earnings 
In Example 1, your group allocated a total of 45 ECUs while other group allocated a total of 
15 ECUs to the group accounts. Let’s say the computer made a random draw and your group 
received the reward. Thus, all the members of your group receive 40 ECUs each from your 
group account plus earnings from their individual accounts. All members of the other group 
receive earnings only from their individual accounts, since their group did not receive the 
reward. The calculation of the total earnings is shown in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2 – Calculation of earnings for both groups 
Your 
group 
Earnings 
from 
group 
account 
Earnings 
from 
individual 
account 
Total period 
earnings 
 
Other 
group 
Earnings 
from 
group 
account 
Earnings 
from 
individual 
account 
Total 
period 
earnings 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
40 
40 
40 
40 
45 
50 
40+40 = 80 
40+45   = 85 
40+50   = 90 
 Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
0 
0 
0 
50 
60 
55 
50 
60 
55 
Total 120 135 255  Total 0 165 165 
 
 
EARNINGS FROM THE EXPERIMENT:  
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 20 periods for actual payment 
using a computer program. You will be paid the sum of the earnings in each of these 5 periods.  
These earnings will be converted to cash at the exchange rate mentioned earlier and will be 
paid at the end of the experiment. 
 
 
Note: All participants in this session will be paid for the same 5 periods.  
 
OUTCOME SCREEN 
At the end of each period, the total number of ECUs in the two groups’ accounts, which group 
received the reward, your earnings from your individual and your group accounts, and your 
total earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Please record 
your results for the period on your record sheet under the appropriate heading.  
  
59 
 
 
 
QUESTIONS TO HELP YOU BETTER UNDERSTAND THE DECISION TASKS 
When everyone has finished reading the instructions, and before the experiment begins, we 
will ask you a few questions regarding the decisions you will make in the experiment. The 
questions will help you understand the calculation of your earnings and ensure that you have 
understood the instructions.  
 
 
 
 
 
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS? 
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Personal Record Sheet  
 
Period 
Earnings from 
individual account 
Earnings from 
your group 
account 
Total  earnings 
for this period 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
7    
8    
9    
10    
11    
12    
13    
14    
15    
16    
17    
18    
19    
20    
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Total Earnings 
 
 
 
Period Chosen Total earnings for this period 
  
  
  
  
  
Total = 
 
 
 
 
 
Sum earnings from table above:      
 
Divide earnings by conversion rate:      25  
 
Earnings in British Pounds:    £    (1) 
 
Earnings from Showing up:   £2    (2) 
 
Total payment received: (1)+(2)  £   
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QUIZ  
3. Does group composition change across periods in the experiment?   
Ans.       Yes            No    
 
Questions 2 to 6 apply to the following information. 
In a given period, suppose the members of your group and the other group chose to allocate 
their ECUs to the group account as it is shown in the table below. 
Your 
group 
Endow- 
ment 
Allocation  
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to the 
group  
account 
 
Other 
group 
Endow- 
ment 
Allocation  
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to the 
group  
account 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
60 
60 
60 
35 
60 
55 
25 
0 
5 
 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
60 
60 
60 
40 
40 
50 
20 
20 
10 
Total 180 150 30  Total 180 130 50 
 
 
2.  How many total ECUs will the computer place into the box?    
Ans. ___________ 
 
 
3.  If the computer makes a random draw out of the box what is the chance of your group 
receiving the reward?    
Ans.       _______    out of  ________ 
 
 
4.  If the computer makes a random draw out of the box what is the chance of the other group 
receiving the reward?    
Ans.       _______    out of  ________ 
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5.  If you are Person 1 in your group and your group did not receive the reward what are your 
period earnings?  
Ans. ___________ 
 
 
6.  If you are Person 2 in your group and your group received the reward what are your period 
earnings?  
Ans. ___________ 
 
 
EXPLANATIONS FOR QUIZ ANSWERS  
 
3. Does group composition change across periods in the experiment? Correct answer: No 
 
Questions 2 to 6 apply to the following information. 
In a given period, suppose the members of your group and the other group chose to allocate 
their ECUs to the group account as it is shown in the table below. 
Your 
group 
Endow- 
ment 
Allocation  
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to the 
group  
account 
 
Other 
group 
Endow- 
ment 
Allocation  
to the 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to the 
group  
account 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
60 
60 
60 
35 
60 
55 
25 
0 
5 
 
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 3 
60 
60 
60 
40 
40 
50 
20 
20 
10 
Total 180 150 30 
 
Total 180 130 50 
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2.  How many total ECUs will the computer place into the box?   Correct answer: 80  
Allocation to the group account by your group and by the other group, i.e., 30 from your group 
PLUS 50 from the other group.   
 
3.  If the computer makes a random draw out of the box what is the chance of your group 
receiving the reward?   – Correct answer: 30 out of 80 
Out of a total of 80 tokens, 30 belong to your group. Thus the chance of your group winning 
any random draw of one token from the box is 30 tokens out of 80.  
 
4.  If the computer makes a random draw out of the box what is the chance of the other group 
receiving the reward?  – Correct answer: 50 out of 80 
Out of a total of 80 tokens, 50 belong to the other group. Thus the chance of the other group 
winning any random draw of one token from the box is 50 tokens out of 80.  
 
5.  If you are Person 1 in your group and your group did not receive the reward what are your 
period earnings?  Correct answer: 35 
Since your group did not win the reward, your earnings from the group account for this period 
are zero. So, your period earnings are equal to your earnings from your individual account. 
From the above table, this is equal to 35 ECUs, your allocation to your individual account. 
 
6.  If you are Person 2 in your group and your group received the reward what are your period 
earnings?  Correct answer: 100 
Since your group did win the reward, your earnings from the group account for this period are 
40 ECUs (Your group wins 120 ECUs which are split equally among all 3 of you). So, your 
period earnings are equal to your earnings from your individual account plus 40 ECUs (your 
earnings from the group account). From the above table, your allocation to your individual 
account is 60. Thus your total period earnings are 60 + 40 = 100 ECUs. 
